The academic debate on deep packet inspection (DPI) centres on methods of network management and copyright protection and is directly linked to a wider debate on freedom of speech on the Internet. The debate is deeply rooted in an Anglo-Saxon perspective of the Internet and is frequently depicted as a titanic struggle for the right to fundamentally free and unfettered access to the Internet. This debate is to a great extent defined by commercial interests. These interests whether of copyright owners, Internet service providers, application developers or consumers, are all essentially economic. All of these groups have little commercial interest in restricting free speech as such. However some might well be prepared to accept a certain amount of ‘collateral damage’ to internet free speech in exchange for higher revenues. It can be argued that more transparent and open practices from network service providers are needed regarding filtering policy and the technology used. Nevertheless these practices are unlikely to fundamentally endanger free speech. Within the international system however, there are a large number of actors who have a considerable interest in limiting free speech, most obviously states. As this paper will argue, the link between deep packet inspection and internet censorship is of far greater concern for freedom of speech than its use in traffic shaping or preventing copyright infringement. At the present time many of the states censoring the internet are already known to use deep packet filtering.

If you're not an expert in Internet surveillance, and you've been following the Iranian protests, this post is for you. It's widely recognized that Iran employs systems of Internet restriction and monitoring to keep its people from engaging in activities it deems subversive, and much has been made of that restriction (recently in a Wall Street Journal story on the communications network sold to Iran by Siemens and Nokia--a story later refuted by the companies). With so much information coming to us from Iran via YouTube and Twitter, and yet all the talk of monitoring, there's a fundamental discrepancy in the discussion: if Iran puts so much effort into monitoring its citizens, how come we keep seeing cell phone videos of protests and violence; how is so much information coming to us via Twitter? And, more broadly, how does Internet surveillance work? How can the government restrict, monitor, or find you if you're doing something illegal/subversive?

THE Chinese government will force the world's biggest technology company Google to block a raft of overseas sites on its search engine. This is China's third major internet censorship move in a month amid growing internet activism in the country and in the shadow of a strong online element in the disputed election in Iran. The attack on Google was issued under a "pornography" crackdown and comes only two weeks after the government surprised its media and technology sector by introducing the "Green Dam Youth Escort" filtering software onto every new computer sold after July 1.

A new legal precedent has been set for UK bloggers. Last week, in the England and Wales High Court, Mr Justice Eady ruled that a police officer who previously wrote about his working life on his NightJack blog, did not have the right to remain anonymous. The claimant - now known to be Detective Constable Richard Horton - had unsuccessfully attempted to get an injunction against The Times newspaper (UK) to stop it naming him. Following the court's ruling Horton has now been issued with a written warning by his police force, the Lancashire Constabulary. A victory for freedom of expression (The Times')… or a severe restriction for freedom of expression (anonymous bloggers)? Popular opinion is divided, though a blog search would indicate that blogger opinion veers towards the latter.